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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROBERT DALE STRALEY, 
PETITIONER, 
v. 
HANKGALETKA, 
RESPONDENT. 
CASENO.990704-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING AND BASIS OF JURISDICTION 
Straley requested extraordinary relief to challenge two prison disciplinary hearings 
(R. 96). He claimed that the prison failed to provide him necessary due process 
protections. The first hearing stemmed from Straley's refusal to provide a urine sample. 
For this violation of prison rules, the prison imposed 30 days of punitive isolation (id.). 
The second hearing arose from Straley's involvement in a fight with another inmate (id.). 
The sanction for this offense was 15 days in punitive isolation (R. 97). * The trial court 
granted respondent's motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. This Court has jurisdiction because the Utah Supreme Court transferred this 
case pursuant to its pour-over authority. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1996). 
APPELLATE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Does punitive isolation for 45 days constitute an "atypical and significant hardship 
in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life" and, therefore, mandate the due 
1
 It appears that eight of the total 45 days ran concurrently (R. 95-96). 
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process protections established in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) See Sandin 
v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995)? This Court reviews the dismissal on a correction-
of-error basis, giving no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Harmon City, 
Inc. v. Nielsen & Senior, 907 P.2d 1162, 1167 (Utah 1995). 
RELEVANT PROVISIONS 
All relevant provisions are discussed in the text of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Straley was involved in a fight with another inmate on May 23, 1998 (R. 95). As a 
result of this behavior, the prison charged him with a violation of disciplinary rules and 
held a hearing to determine culpability and the appropriate sanction. The hearing officer 
concluded that Straley had been involved in the fight and imposed thirty (30) days of 
punitive isolation (id). At approximately the same time, correctional officers ordered 
Straley to submit to a urine test and provide a urine sample (id.). Straley refused and was 
consequently charged with a disciplinary infraction for refusing to submit to a urine test 
(id.). The hearing officer found that Straley had committed the infraction and imposed 
fifteen (15) days of isolation (R. 96). Straley appealed both hearings through the prison's 
internal administrative process, which upheld the decisions (id.). 
Straley subsequently filed this petition for extraordinary relief, claiming that the 
hearings violated due process. He included in his petition allegations that the prison 
failed to provide him 24-hour notice of the hearing, used a computerized signature on the 
charging document and the decision, relied on "falsified" information, lacked 
impartiality, and failed to use a disciplinary committee for the hearing. However, he did 
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not claim that his isolation was materially different from the conditions imposed on 
inmates in purely discretionary segregation, such as administrative segregation or 
protective custody. 
After respondent filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief, 
attaching various documents from the prison regarding the reasons for the discipline and 
the procedures used, the trial court granted the dismissal motion and denied extraordinary 
relief.2 The trial court based its decision on Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995), 
an opinion from the United States Supreme Court that narrowed greatly an inmate's 
ability to argue that prison disciplinaries require procedural due process protection. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Under current federal supreme court precedent, inmates are entitled to due process 
before the imposition of discipline only when the sanction constitutes a "dramatic 
departure" from his sentence or an "atypical and significant hardship." Straley's 45 day 
term of punitive isolation, on the other hand, was well within the reasonably expected 
contours of a fifteen year indeterminate term. Consequently, even if the prison failed to 
provide minimal due process protections, that failure does not create a constitutional 
violation. 
2
 Although respondent attached various documents to its dismissal motion, 
potentially transforming it into a summary judgment proceeding, the trial court does not 
appear to have based its decision on any of those facts. Instead, it made a pure legal 
conclusion grounded on the allegations of the petition (R. 139). 
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ARGUMENT 
THE DISCIPLINE IMPOSED ON STRALEY FALLS WITHIN THE 
EXPECTED PERIMETERS OF HIS ONE-TO-FIFTEEN YEAR 
SENTENCES; THEREFORE, HE IS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY 
ENTITLED TO THE PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS SET FORTH 
IN WOLFF v. MCDONNELL. 
Straley claims that the prison failed to provide him the due process protections 
required by Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (R. 7, 8). Decided in 1974, Wolff 
held that the Nebraska prison rules on disciplinary proceedings gave inmates a protected 
liberty interest that could be abridged only via due process. The essential elements of due 
process as then identified in fTo/^consisted of 24-hour notice, an opportunity to defend, 
and a written decision setting forth the rationale. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-68. Wolff and its 
progeny looked to the language of a state statute, rule, or policy to decide if the language 
was mandatory. If so, the mandatory language created a liberty interest that was then 
given due process protection. In other words, failure to comply with prison regulations 
could result in a constitutional violation. 
In 1995, however, the high court substantially limited Wolff to disciplinary 
proceedings or other events that result in sanctions that constitute "atypical and 
significant hardships on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." 
Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). With Sandin, the court departed from an 
analysis based on the language of a rule or policy to an analysis based on the nature of the 
sanction imposed in the context of "the ordinary incidents of prison life." Id. If the 
amount of discipline imposed is within the "expected perimeters of the sentence" the 
inmate is not entitled to procedural due process, even those set forth in Wolff. The Sandin 
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court discussed the evolution of prison due process cases and explained its reasons for 
abandoning then current law. 
[W]e believe that the search for a negative implication from 
mandatory language in prisoner regulations has strayed from 
the real concerns undergirding the liberty protected by the 
Due Process Clause.. . . States may under certain 
circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by 
the Due Process Clause. But these interests will be generally 
limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding 
the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to 
protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force 
nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the 
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. 
Id. at 483-84 (citations omitted). 
The Sandin court identified only two in which state action exceeded the sentence 
in such an "unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause by 
its own force." Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) and Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 
210 (1990) give rise to due process protection of their own force. Vitek concerned the 
involuntary transfer of a mentally ill inmate to a mental hospital; Harper involved the 
involuntary administration of psychiatric drugs on prison inmates. Both mandated due 
process because of the stigmatizing consequences of being labeled mentally ill. The label 
was "qualitatively different from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person 
convicted of a crime." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 478 n.4. 
In contrast to those two circumstances are those incidents of prison life already 
determined to be undeserving of procedural due process protection. These include a 
transfer to an out-of-state prison, Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983), visitation 
privileges, Kentucky Dep V of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454 (1989), and non-
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punitive transfer to a maximum security unit, Meachum v. Fano, All U.S. 215, 227 
(1976). Sandin added another event that is not entitled to due process protection, i.e., 
punitive isolation of up to 30 days. "[T]hough concededly punitive, [Connor's isolation] 
does not present a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of Connor's 
indeterminate sentence." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. 
In applying Sandin courts have not bound themselves to the 30-day period 
mentioned in that case, but have concluded that terms of isolation far beyond that period 
of time also do not create a protected liberty interest. See, e.g., Sealey v. Giltner, 197 
F.3d 578, 589 (2nd Cir. 1999) (101 days); Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 504 (4th Cir. 
1997) (six months of segregation not atypical even though it occurred in "especially 
disgusting conditions"); Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810, 812 (6th Cir. 1998) (two and one-
half years in non-punitive isolation); Mackay v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(eight months); Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 761 (7th Cir. 1997) (71 days). 
One case in which a court intimated that it might find an atypical and significant 
hardship shows the contrast with the relatively innocuous circumstances of Straley's case. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Perkins v. Kansas Dep V of Corrections, 165 F.3d 
803, 809 (10th Cir. 1999) reversed the sua sponte dismissal of a complaint from an inmate 
who claimed that his conditions of confinement were unusually burdensome. When he 
filed his complaint, Perkins had been restricted to isolation for more than a year, 
prohibited from leaving his cell for more than a half-hour a day, and required to wear a 
face mask whenever he left. Perkins, who was HIV-positive, claimed that the restrictions 
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seriously interfered with his health.3 Given those allegations, said the court, it could not 
conclude that the complaint was obviously without merit. Perkins, 165 F.3d at 806. 
Straley, on the other hand, does not make any similar allegations. In fact, he 
makes no allegations regarding the actual circumstances of his isolation (R. 7-13). He 
certainly fails to explain how the conditions imposed upon him were "materially different 
from those conditions imposed on inmates in . . . administrative segregation or protective 
custody" or that they created a "major disruption" in his environment. Resnick v. Hayes, 
200 F.3d 641, 646 (9th Cir. 2000).4 His complaints do not compare with even the bare 
allegations of Perkins' complaint. Rather, they are more comparable to those cases, like 
Sandin, Sealey, Beverati, Jones, Mackey, and Thomas, that found no atypical hardship by 
the mere occurrence of isolation. Straley's grievances are even less similar to Vitek or 
Harper, which involved the stigmatizing consequences of being labeled mentally ill. 
3
 The appellate court's reversal also must be viewed in the procedural context of 
that case. The district court dismissed the complaint sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which is appropriate only "where it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot 
prevail on the facts he has alleged and it would be futile to give him an opportunity to 
amend." Perkins, 165 F.3d at 806. Essentially, the court concluded that the trial court 
had been too hasty in its dismissal. Contrary to Perkins, the complaints in Sealey, 
Beverati, Jones, Mackay, Thomas, and Sandin were dismissed only at the summary 
judgment or trial stage. 
4
 Straley's failure to make these allegations in his complaint or in his response to the 
motion to dismiss left the trial court with no choice but to assume that his isolation was 
"within the range of confinement to be expected by prison inmates." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 
486-87. Consequently, he failed to establish a cognizable claim for relief under rule 
12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Resnick, 200 F.3d at 646 (affirming dismissal 
under federal rule). 
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What Straley argues is that the mere occurrence of discipline mandated due 
process. Vvz-Sandin, this claim would have sufficed. After Sandin, however, it does not. 
As the Sixth Circuit held in Resnick, an inmate must allege a material difference in his 
conditions when compared to typical imprisonment. Otherwise, he has not even set forth 
a claim. "Discipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of misconduct falls 
within the expected perimeters of the sentence imposed by a court of law." Sandin, 515 
U.S. at 485. When Straley entered the prison to serve his concurrent one-to-fifteen year 
terms, he may not have surrendered all of his constitutional rights at the prison gate, but 
he surely did not keep the one that entitles him to social hour with other inmates. His 
period of isolation was not so unduly burdensome or unusual that it presented a "dramatic 
departure" from his sentence. Consequently, the due process clause is not implicated by 
the prison's imposition of that sanction.5 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's order denying relief and dismissing the petition should be 
affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED T H I S ^ 7 May 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
7AMES H. BEADLES 
Assistant Attorney General 
5
 Straley does not argue that Utah's due process clause mandates a result different 
from that reached in Sandin. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
2000,1 mailed, by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, two copies of this 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE to: 
ROBERT DALE STRALEY 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Attorney Frc Se 
^(0, (?<>< -Z.1TO faddress \ 
in THE -^U\rt\ DISTr.ICT COURT, 4<wr A A ^ COUNTY 
STATE 0 ? UTAH 
P e t i t i o n e r , s PETITION 70?. ZXTRAOHI'IKAr.Y 
vs. * U?£~ Rule £=B 
X 
H»KU (?^\*tk*, £nassl« 
r.£socnc£riu. s jucre 
COSES NOW the Petitioner, ~fal„iA $^//.y - fna~e^. pursuant 
to the follovino Rule cf Civil Procedure: 
Rule £5B(b) since claim is based en wrongful restraint en 
rersonal liberty includincr conditions or 
X Rule 553(d) since claim is based en an vroncful use cf 
judicial authority cr failure to comply with a 
duty. (Actions in Board cf Pardons and 
disciplinary hearings). 
and for cause cf action alleres as follows: 
1. Petitioner is beinc restrained at the followina location: 
(list your address) |p>a, ^ oy: 2J5o ThtepfV i)V *%HQZO . 
PETITION FOR WRIT FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF 
2. Petitioner is challenging the following (check one and 
give date of action). 
Heard of Pardons hearing, which took place en 
-v Disciplinary hearing, which tock place en *%^*z.y-<g^ 
Condition of confinement, which tock place en . 
3. No ether plain, speedy and acerbate rer.edy is available 
recardinc this natter. 
4. In rlain and concise terns, all cf the facts en the ba~i#s 
ei wmen tne renticner clair.s a surstartial violation ci richts as 
the result cf the Board cf Pardons, and/cr disciplinary hearing, 
and/or conditions cf confinement. 
• ^ k t l l i f d ^cAAtiAAfiAJ \v\ 4 U c i y ^ M\*Aif>\tiAtA + *f iTf \OtxrT 
C^l W ^ \AO\ e^wfti^ ZH fir v\o\\tt o{ -WAL lA*t\(riyncj , 
_ Vi^U-f j n^
 < 
PETITION FOR WRIT FOR"EXTRAORDINARY RIIIZ2 
(£) c\\cA V A O 4 t)o ^HA -tVPuA fr-f <?l oU'SCf.p)? 
0>m n* i f/f^ . 
(1) f - l e^ ty*^ vi-Cittr \<\cU<A _Tn* p*\\r-\i*i\-t-J , 
PETITION FOR WRIT FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF 
the discipl inary hearing has been reviewed en appeal: 
p(. Yes No Explain Result of Appeal. 
Revised 7/96 
In 
PETITION FOR WRIT FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF 
Question net applicable since this clain concerns a Board 
of Pardons action for which there is no appeal or 
administrative remedy. 
I have previously filed a Petition for Writ of 
iordinarv r.elief; 
Yes X No  
S. The following documents are attached hereto and 
X % • • • • • . m • • • . • . . • • • . m . • 
cf the f i l inc fee. 
C-her evidence tha t supports Pe t i t ioner ' s allegations 
Copies cf pleadings, crders and nenoranda in any pr ior 
proceeding dealing with these i ssues . 
5. Petitioner was unable to obtain and attach the following 
documents because ( l i s t the efforts you made to obtain the 
documents and the resul ts cf your ef for ts ) : Av^wscV) />•!*> 
10. That pursuant to URC? Rules 633(b)(3) and 635(d) as 
appropriate, Petitioner requests that t h i s Court order the 
S Revised 7/96 
I I 
PETITION FOR WRIT FOR EXTRAORDINARY RILII? 
Respondent to obtain such transcripts of proceedings cr reccrds 
which are relevant and material to this case and requests that the 
responsible county/Administrative Agency be directed to pay the 
costs cf the proceeding. (See attached notion and affidavit cf 
ir.pecunicsity). 
11. X This acticn has been filed under Rule 655(b) cr Rule 
653(d). Therefore, the four v==r statute cf limitations 
set forth in UCA Szz. 7E-12-25(3) applies. 
This acticn has been filed beyond the applicable statute 
cf limitations because cf the following reasons: 
Petitioner asks nhis court to find that the interest cf 
justice reruire the court to eicuse Petitioner's failure 
to file within the time limitations. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court: 
1. Schedule an evidentiary hearing at which tine Petitioner 
Eay be present and represented by counsel. 
2. Permit Petitioner, who remains indigent; to proceed 
without prepaym=nt cf costs, fees or other assessments. 
3. Order Respondent to provide transcripts of records of 
proceedings which are relevant to this cause of action. 
4. Grant Petitioner the authority to obtain subpoenas in 
6 Revised 7/96 
PETITION FOR WRIT FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF 
Fcnna Pauperis, fcr witnesses and documents necessary to assist in 
the proof of the farts alleged in the petition as stated above, 
5. Issue an Order fcr Extraordinary Relief to have the 
Petitioner brought before it, to the end that the illegal activity 
\r-e (ovdt 
A^pO^CiZ d^Ci pUyx^yy 
Dated this *%& dsv cf ot+ol*<\r . / ^ * * *» • 
^ 4 "OftU 5 W U y ' (riS3&\ 
Attorney rro £= 
PETITIONER'S VERIFICATION UNDER OATH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY Or ^c\\Ul/c ] * * 
I the undersigned petitioner, declare under penalty cf perjury 
>-£a~ the infcmaticn I have creviced in this cetiticn is true and 
correct. 
~^:AAA 
Sicnature cf Petitions 
SUBSCRIBED. AND SWORN to befogs E5 en, this <SfL 
NOTARYPUBLIC 
STATE OF I 
MyCommisaon 
Februaiy 
DONALD 
day or 
 T NOTARY t>U5UC T7T77 / 
S5SSSL HyCoLirfe'Expires : ^ M ^ / 
w / 14,2001 I ' 
^F.MORREa I
 7 Revised evised 7/95 | *^ 
ADDENDUM B 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT DALE STRALEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HANK GALETKA, 
Defendant 
DECISION ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Case No: 980912168 
Judge: THORNE, WILLIAM A 
Date: 7/21/99 
Clerk: lawclerk 
The Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is granted. The Petitioner's 
Motion for a Hearing on the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and 
Discovery request are denied. The Petitioner is seeking relief 
from two prison disciplinary actions, one in which he was sentenced 
to thirty days in punitive isolation and the other, fifteen days in 
punitive isolation. Petitioner claims that his due process rights 
were violated. A prisoner's due process protections attach only 
where the prison disciplinary action results in the deprivation of 
a prisoner's protected liberty interest. Superintendent, 
Massachusetts Correctional Institute v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 453 
(1985) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)). The 
Supreme Court in Sandin v. Conner held that 3 0 days puntive 
isolation imposed in a prison disciplinary action "did not present 
the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State 
might conceivably create a liberty interest." Sandin v. Conner, 
515 U.S. 486 (1995). Petitioner Straley's is n^%ZJSM£9Xded due 
result in the deprivation of a protected 1 i^ yty<^ fer>t§:r££b\ 
Page 1 (last) \v\ 
